. The probabilistic prior information required for Bayesian analysis is found to be surprisingly light: despite the model's lack of identification a proper posterior is guaranteed for any bounded prior density, including those representing improper priors. This result is illustrated with the improper uniform prior, which implies marginal posterior densities obtainable by integrating the likelihood function; surprisingly, the posterior mode for the regression slope is the usual least squares estimate.
INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM CONSIDERED here is that of estimating 9 in the relationship 
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bounded with respect to 0, is integrable. Section 3 examines the inferences implied by an improper uniform prior. The marginal posterior density for 0 is then simply the integrated likelihood function, which is shown to have a marginal mode equal to the slope estimate from the least squares regression of y on x. This inference is, surprisingly, invariant to normalization: a uniform prior on the parameters implied by replacing (1) with Xi = Y* + 0*,qi gives a posterior for 0* = 0-1 that is taken by the appropriate transformation into the posterior for 0 obtained from the original normalization. Section 4 shows how nonintegrable densities represent improper finitely additive priors, and confirms that using such priors to draw inferences about the model in this paper satisfies de Finetti's coherence criterion.
The proofs of all propositions and lemmas are given in the Appendix. The set A(V) is graphed as the shaded region in Figure 1 . This figure represents the set of pairs (9, axx) for which there exist positive definite measurement error covariance matrices such that (3) yields a given V. The importance of A( V) is that conditional on the. reduced form (mi, V) it is the support for any distribution on (9, ixx). Note that A(V) is unbounded with respect to 9. For comparison the well known "errors-in-variables bound" derived by Gini (1921) for the uncorrelated errors model is depicted in Figure 1 as the projection onto the 0-axis of the intersection of A(V) and the hyperbola given by setting aue = 0 in (3).
THE INTEGRABILITY OF THE LIKELIHOOD
Denote by (z, S) the maximum likelihood estimate of (m, V) from (4); it is well known that this estimate is The information about 6 contained in the structural likelihood function is of an "indirect" nature, and requires some explanation. Apply the transformation (6, oxx, ") -(, axx, m, V), shown in the Appendix to have a Jacobian identically equal to one, to both sides of (5) to obtain A(V) at 6, i.e., the inequality (6). The integral in brackets is the conditional prior density f(6 Im, V). When identification is absent, therefore, data-inspired revision of opinion about 6 is indirect, relying on an a priori dependence between 6 and the reduced form parameters (m, V) that is expressed through the density f(6lm, V); posterior beliefs about 6 are then a "weighted average" of conditional-on-reduced form prior beliefs, the weights supplied by the reduced form posterior. Although a prior for the structural parameters need not express any prior dependence between 9 and the other structural parameters, a dependence between 9 and (m, V) is induced by the transformation (9, ax, 'I) -+ (, axx, m, V); this is so even if f(9, oxx, 4') is constant on 2, because the dependence is partially transmitted via A(V). Note that (9) implies that the limiting posterior for 9 obtained by letting n -oo will not concentrate its mass at a single point; in fact, it can be shown that with probability one the distribution function for 9-given-z converges uniformly to the distribution function for 0-given-(m, V), with m and V at their true values. It would be very troubling if the posterior did concentrate, since there can be no consistent estimators of the unidentified 9. Kadane (1974) , generalizing a result Dreze obtained for simultaneous equations models, shows that a proper posterior in any unidentified model with a reduced form will imply marginal posterior representations analogous to (9). Posterior propriety thus requires of prior densities on a structural parameter space that they generate an integrable conditional density analogous to f( 9, axx Im, V). Structural space prior densities that meet this requirement typically have a product representation wherein one factor is an integrable density. For example, in a simultaneous equations model that fails to meet the order condition for identification it is necessary for posterior propriety that the structural prior density have as a factor an integrable density for a subset of the parameters (Dreze and Richard (1983, p. 538)). It is apparently unusual for the likelihood functions of interesting unidentified models to be integrable and therefore analyzable by prior densities not having integrable factors, such as the uniform density. The present paper provides an example, and so does Hill (1967) , who demonstrates likelihood integrability for a generalization of the one-way analysis of variance model.
THE POSTERIOR FOR 0 IMPLIED BY A UNIFORM PRIOR DENSITY
This section examines the inferences implied by a uniform prior density on Q. The posterior density is then simply the normalized likelihood function, which has been shown to have a modal set that is unbounded with respect to 9. Nevertheless, it will be shown that the marginal posterior density for 9 is symmetric about a unique mode at the slope estimate from the least squares regression of y on x, a result that is invariant to renormalizing (1) so that Xi is the left hand variable.
Letting S denote an element of S, the sample counterparts to 8 Note that a reader skeptical of an assumption of perfect measurement in a reported study can use (16) to discount the claimed inferential precision; this discount is more or less meaningful depending on whether the correlated error-uniform prior density combination is a more or less acceptable representation of the reader's beliefs. Inferences about one-sided intervals can still be usefully precise even with relatively large posterior dispersion. As an example consider the sign probability P(O > OIz) = 1-P(9 < 0z) ---arctan (-A).
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Multiplying both the numerator and denominator of the ratio in parentheses by V;Syls-xx yields an expression depending only on the correlation r: 11 r 1 1 P(O > ?Iz)~ 2--arctan r2) = -+-arcsin(r). Table I gives this probability for a variety of r values. We see that an r2 as low as .25 implies a 2/3 probability that 9 is positive, an r2 of .5 raises this probability to 3/4, and an r2 of .75 gives a probability of about .83. A uniform prior density appears to introduce little information about any of the structural parameters, suggesting it may be useful for expressing extreme uncertainty. There are two interesting transformations under which this apparent uncertainty persists. The first is the renormalization of (1) The symmetry between the original formulation and (17) makes it desirable that a uniform prior density on Q be consistent with a uniform density over the analogous parameter space Q* implied by (17). If this is not so then unintended information is being injected into the analysis of the relationship between 'q and X, in the sense that assigning a uniform prior density to Q* rather than Q would imply a posterior for 9* that could not be taken by the transformation 9 = 1/9* into the distribution for 9 given by ( be Cauchy densities with location zero and scale one. In the Appendix it is shown that for general V the density (18) has a supremum and infimum at the angles of, respectively, the major and minor axes of the contour ellipses of f(yi, xiIm, V).
COHERENCE AND FINITELY ADDITIVE IMPROPER PRIORS
Various difficulties appear to accompany the use of improper priors. For example, under weak conditions Bayes decision rules will always be admissible with proper priors, but they may not be admissible with improper priors. Similarly, the so-called marginalization paradoxes can afflict only improper priors. Such anomalies cast doubt on the desirability of using improper priors.
For most Bayesians a "desirable" inferential procedure is one that is coherent, which means that the beliefs of the inferrer about hypotheses and observables satisfy a normative description of rational behavior under uncertainty; such beliefs "cohere" with each other, i.e., they are not mutually contradictory. Numerous descriptions of rational behavior under uncertainty have been devised, a particularly influential one being that of de Finetti (1937). According to de Finetti an individual's beliefs are coherent if, should the individual be forced to make a finite number of bets in accordance with these beliefs, there is no set of bets such that the individual will lose money regardless of the outcome. In this scheme the probability of an event is operationally defined to be the price at which the (coherent) individual will buy or sell gambles paying one monetary unit should this event occur; conditional probabilities are defined to be the prices of gambles that are called off if the conditioning event does not occur. Probabilities so defined are finitely, but not necessarily countably, additive; i.e., the infinite series sum of the probabilities assigned to the elements of a countably infinite partition of a set B need not equal the probability assigned to B. For such partitions conditional expectations may be nonconglomerable, which means they satisfy E(+) < infE (4l7i) For unbounded continuous spaces a proper finitely additive probability measure can be represented in the usual manner by an integrable density, although if the measure is not also countably additive the notion of integral must be consistent with finite additivity; e.g., the Reimann integral. An improper finitely additive probability measure can be represented as the limit of a sequence of countably additive probability measures obtained by restricting a nonintegrable density to an increasing sequence of subsets whose union is the outcome space. In particular, for the model of this paper an improper finitely additive prior T on ?2 can be represented by a nonintegrable density f(9, (xx, I) according to where a(Q) is a a-algebra of subsets of Q2, { ?2,n} C a(?2) is a sequence such that 2n T 2 and the denominator in (19) is finite, and ao(S) c a(S2) is the set of events for which the limit exists. If f(6, axx, I) is bounded then it suffices for the terms of {Q n} to be compact sets; an example is the intersection between 2 and the sequence of R 7-spheres of diameter n. Note that by choice of sequence a single density can represent many different priors, including those that assign sharp probabilities to desired unbounded B. Note also that every compact B will be assigned probability zero, the distinguishing characteristic of an improper prior. It must be emphasized that "improper" distributions are true probability distributions in the finitely additive framework.
Regazzini (op. cit., p. 856) gives conditions ensuring that Bayes' theorem will yield a proper posterior that, together with a given family of data distributions and improper prior, constitutes de Finetti-coherent prices for gambles on events from Q and the sample space Z. Specialized to the model of this paper these conditions are simply that the nonintegrable density f(O, axx, 4) used in (5) be related to the researcher's prior T according to (19), and that the resulting posterior density be integrable over Q for all z E Z. If Z is restricted to samples where S is positive definite, then these conditions are satisfied if the conditions of Proposition 1 hold and the researcher's beliefs are described by bounded f(' axx, I) with suitably chosen { Q}. Theorem 1.4 of Regazzini (op. cit., p. 849) ensures that the resulting probability assignments agree with coherent assignments defined on the unrestricted Z that includes semi-definite S. Note that because the posterior is proper it is represented by the posterior density in the usual way; in particular, it is completely insensitive to variations within the class of priors obtained by combining differing { Q } with a fixed prior density. 
Multiplying by sx,>5 and rearranging then yields the kemel of (12), Q.E.D.
